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Effectiveness of Competition Law:  
A Panel Data Analysis 
Abstract 
The paper explores what macroeconomic factors can tell us about the effectiveness of 
recently enacted national competition laws. Qualitative evidence suggests that numerous 
countries fall short in implementing competition law. Furthermore, there seems to be 
significant differences between countries. To examine what factors might contribute to 
the explanation of effectiveness of competition law panel regression analysis is used. 
The  results  indicate  that  the  level  of  economic  development  matters,  however  the 
institutional  learning  curve  is  also  relevant.  Furthermore,  larger  countries  should  be 
more  concerned  with  competition  advocacy  activities  than  smaller  countries  and  it 
seems  to  be  the  case  that  the  problem  of  capture  of  competition  law  is  serious  in 
countries with high levels of corruption.  
Keywords: Competition law enforcement, developing and transition countries 
JEL-Codes: K21, L40 
Zusammenfassung 
Die  Studie  untersucht  welche  Faktoren  die  Effektivität  von  jüngst  eingeführten 
Wettbewerbsgesetzen beeinflusst. Qualititative Studien zeigen, dass die Effektivität des 
Wettbewerbsrechts in zahlreichen Ländern zu wünschen übrig lässt. Ferner zeigt sich, 
dass es bedeutende Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern hinsichtlich der Effektivität der 
Wettbewerbsgesetze  gibt.  Um  zu  untersuchen,  welche  Faktoren  die  Effektivität  von 
Wettbewerbsgesetzen  beeinflussen,  wird  die  Methode  der  Panel  Daten  Analyse 
verwendet.  Die  Ergebnisse  zeigen,  dass  der  wirtschaftliche  Entwicklungsstand  von 
Bedeutung ist, aber auch dass Lerneffekte eine Rolle spielen. Ferner zeigt sich, dass 
größere  Länder  der  Informationspolitik  größere  Bedeutung  beimessen  sollten  als 
kleinere  Länder.  Außerdem  deuten  die  Ergebnisse  darauf  hin,  dass  Korruption  ein 
ernsthaftes Problem für die effektive Implementierung von Wettbewerbsgesetzen sein 
kann. 
Schlagwörter: Wettbewerbsrecht, Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländer 
JEL-Codes: K21, L40  
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1  Introduction 
In recent decades a vast proliferation of national competition laws can be observed. 
More  and  more  states  enacted  a  law  that  can  be  defined  “as  the  set  of  rules  and 
disciplines maintained by governments relating either to agreements between firms that 
restrict competition or to the abuse of a dominant position (including attempts to create 
a  dominant  position  through  mergers)”  (Hoekman  &  Holmes  1999,  p.  877).  Rules 
commonly included in these competition laws are provisions on (i) horizontal restraints 
or cartels, (ii) vertical restraints, (iii) abuse of dominant position or monopolization, and 
(iv) mergers and acquisitions (see e.g. WTO 2003). In particular, until 1979 only around 
24 countries had competition law, most of them developed countries. In the 1980s a 
further  seven  countries  implemented  competition  law.  Since  then  countries  that 
controlled restrictive business practice by competition law increased considerably. From 
1990 to 1999 around 58 countries took the step of enacting competition law. Since 2000 
a  further  13  countries  enacted  such  a  law.  Especially,  since  the  1990s,  a  lot  of 
developing and transition countries took the step of enactment. All in all, today around 
102 countries have competition law (see Annex 1)1. 
To pass a competition law signifies not necessarily that this law is effectively enforced. 
Country  specific  factors  like  stage  of  economic  development,  and  economic  and 
political  realities  are  likely  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  effective  enforcement. 
Qualitative empirical evidence indicates that numerous countries that recently enacted 
competition law fall short in implementing their competition law effectively and that 
there are some differences between countries. For example, CUTS, who reviewed the 
competition regimes of India, Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and 
Zambia, states that the competition regimes “in most of the countries selected […] are 
quite ineffective” (CUTS 2003b, p. 1). Another in-depth analysis of the competition 
policies  of  eighteen  transition  countries  by  Dutz  and  Vagliasindi  (2000,  pp.  4-5) 
indicates that, within this sample, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, and Estonia 
have so far the most effective competition policy. Hölscher and Stephan (2004, pp. 335-
43),  reviewing  the  competition  policies  of  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
Romania, and Slovenia, suggest that the competition policies of these countries are to 
some  extent  well  under way.  However,  they  concede  that  some  deficits  remain,  for 
example  in  the  institutional  settings  of  Romania and Poland. Furthermore, available 
indicators on the effectiveness of competition policy (see Annex 2 and 3) indicate that in 
                                                 
1   The exact number is difficult to determine. However, Kronthaler and Stephan (2007) provide an 
actual overview of which countries can be considered to have competition law. Furthermore, it is 
sometimes difficult to determine when a country enacted its competition law for the first time. For 
example Poland enacted its first competition laws in 1933 (The Act on Cartels) and 1939 (The 
Antimonopoly Act). These laws, however, were abrogated during socialism. In 1990 Poland enacted 
a serious competition law again.  
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a lot of countries competition policy is quite ineffective, however, with some differences 
between countries.  
The objective of the present study is to examine what factors contribute to effective 
competition  law  implementation  of  recently  enacted  national  competition  laws.  To 
examine  this,  panel  estimation  technique  is  used.  In  the  best  case,  the  estimation 
equations would be embedded in a structural model and derived rigorously. However, 
due to the lack of a structural model exploratory data analysis is used. This, with the 
hope to provide other researchers and practitioner’s helpful insights what contributes to 
effective implementation of competition law. Literature, however, leads us not complete 
guideless. First, there are many qualitative studies, which give hints what factors might 
influence effective competition law implementation (e.g. Khemani & Dutz 1995; WTO 
1998; Laffont 1999; CUTS 2003b; Mehta 2003; Contributions to the OECD Global 
Fora on Competition2). Second, two empirical studies (Palim 1998 and Kronthaler & 
Stephan 2007) exist that examine on the basis of reasons for and against competition 
law what influences the probability that a country enacts such a law. These two studies 
can be used beside the qualitative studies as good guides which determinants should be 
included in our analysis. The main idea behind this is that the reasons against and for 
enactment of competition law may be prevalent within the respective country even after 
enactment and might influence effective implementation of competition law. 
To the best of our knowledge this is one of the first quantitative empirical studies with 
this approach. So far there exists only one attempt in this direction, a study by Lee 
(2005). This study focuses on legal tradition, which is not found to contribute to the 
explanation of competition law enforcement3 (see Lee 2005, pp. 245-56). 
Section  2  discusses  the  factors  that  might  influence  effective  enforcement  of 
competition law. Section 3 describes the estimation method, the data used and discusses 
the empirical results. Section 4 summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions. 
                                                 
2   Contributions  to  the  several  OECD  Global  Fora  on  Competition  can  be  found  at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,2340,en_2649_37463_2732220_1_1_1_37463,00.html.  For  an 
analysis of the contributions to the OECD Global Fora on Competition see Kronthaler et al. (2005).  
3   Additionally to legal tradition the study controls for level of economic development, budget per staff, 
and the age of the competition law.  
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2  Macroeconomic factors that might contribute to effective 
competition law implementation 
As  indicated  above,  the  qualitative  studies,  Palim  (1998)  as  well  as  Kronthaler  and 
Stephan (2007) can be used as good guides which factors should be considered when 
examine exploratory what determinants might have an impact on effective enforcement 
of  competition  law.  In  particular,  these  studies  indicate  that  the  level  of  economic 
development, the size of an economy, transition and economic reforms, foreign direct 
investment,  sectoral  structure,  economic  activity  of  the  state,  openness  to  trade, 
international organizations, membership in regional trade agreements, and corruption 
might have an impact on effective enforcement of competition law. In the following, 
these factors are discussed with regard to effective enforcement of competition law. 
Starting with the level of economic development there might be good reasons that the 
level  of  economic  development  not  only  influences  the  probability  of  enacting 
competition law, but also effective implementation. In particular, poorer countries may 
rely  more  on  interventionist  development  policies,  have  greater  problems  with 
competing priorities, like social policies which might be more relevant than competition 
law, and have more difficulties in the implementation process, e.g. resources are scarcer, 
juridical systems are less developed, academic infrastructure is less advanced, etc. (see 
Khemani & Dutz 1995, p. 27; Laffont 1999, p. 252; CUTS 2003b, p. 1; Mehta 2003, pp. 
14-5). Thus, the level of economic development may be a determinant that influence 
whether a competition law is effectively enforced or not. 
The size of the economy might be a further factor that influence whether a country 
enforce its competition law or not. There are mainly two reasons. First, small economies 
normally have small domestic markets, which do not allow numerous firms to produce 
at the necessary firm size to use economies of scale. Hence, mergers and acquisitions as 
well as a certain concentration is seen as necessary with a view to efficiency, welfare, 
and international competitiveness (see e.g. Evenett 2003, p. 21; Gal 2001, p. 1445). In 
short,  it  is  claimed  that  benefits  from  economies  of  scale  exceed  the  benefits  of  a 
competition  law  (see  e.g.  Langhammer  2000).  Second,  it  is  argued  that  small  open 
economies are exposed to competition from abroad. Thus, it is argued that a competition 
law  is  not  necessary  to  discipline  markets.  Both  reasons  indicate  that  effective 
enforcement of competition law might be not seen as a necessity or that there might be 
stronger  resistance  against  effective  enforcement  in  smaller  countries  than  in  larger 
countries. However, the academic literature indicates too that there might be reasons 
why small countries should enforce competition law. In particular, it is argued that entry 
barriers in small economies are relatively higher compared to larger economies and that 
the ‘invisible hand’ is much weaker. The reasons are manifold. Scale economies might 
allow  market  entry  only  when  the  entrant  can  skim  a  sufficiently  large  domestic 
demand. Small population size constrains human capital and the availability of skilled  
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labour.  Natural  resources  may  be  limited  to  some  extent.  Additionally,  the business 
community might be much more interconnected. Hence, the possibility to enter a market 
is restrained due to personal proximity (Gal 2001, pp. 1447-8). 
Economic  reforms  can  be  a  further  factor,  which  have  an  impact  on  effective 
enforcement of competition law. The point is that, since the seventies, and especially 
with  the  demise  of  the  central  planning  system, state-governance of developing and 
transition  economies  is  increasingly  replaced  by stronger  adherence  to  market-based 
economies. In this respect it is increasingly recognized that privatisation, deregulation, 
and  trade  liberalisation  alone  are  not  sufficient  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the 
economy. These policies have to be supplemented by competition law and competition 
policy to realise the maximum possible benefits (see e.g. CUTS 2003a, p. 17; WTO 
1998, pp. 3-4). This suggests that countries, which implement economic reforms are 
concerned with effective enforcement of competition law. However, in the literature it is 
sometimes observed that countries which are undergoing economic reforms fear that 
competition law and its enforcement take away scarce resources from higher priorities 
like privatisation, deregulation, and building the relevant institutions (see e.g. Kovacic 
2001, pp. 288-9). 
Fourthly,  there  might  be  a  relationship  between  the  importance  of  foreign  direct 
investment for capital accumulation and enforcement of competition law. The point is 
that  countries  for  which foreign  direct  investment  is  of great importance for capital 
accumulation  might  enforce  competition  law  more  effective  in  order  to  provide  a 
market-oriented and transparent framework which increases the investors’ reliance in 
the  economy  and  reduces  transaction  costs  (see  WTO  1998,  pp.  8-9).  However,  in 
particular  in  developing  countries  it  is  sometimes  feared  that  competition  law  may 
negatively affect the inflow of foreign direct investment as it reduces the possibility of 
preferential  treatment  to  attract  foreign  direct  investors.  Hence,  some  countries  for 
which foreign direct investment is of great importance might shy away from effective 
enforcement of competition law. 
Another factor, discussed in the literature, which might influence effective enforcement 
of competition law, is the level of industrialisation. First, it is suggested that concerns on 
competition may increase with the country’s level of industrialisation, because in pre-
industrialised societies, the necessity of protecting competition is often not recognised, 
whereas in industrialised economies, the perception of the need to protect competition 
between  different  competitors  increase  (Cira  1982,  pp.  30-1).  Second,  developing 
countries  in  which  support  is  strong  to  reach  and  maintain  a  high  level  of 
industrialisation  may  not  effectively  apply  competition  law  due  to  concerns  that 
competition law might compromise their established industries. 
Furthermore, there might be a relationship between economic activity of the state and 
effective  enforcement  of  competition  law.  The  higher  the  state  dominated  share  of 
economic  activity  in  the  economy  is  the  lesser  the  state  might  be  concerned  about  
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effective enforcement of competition law. Markets play a less decisive role in countries 
where the state-dominated share of economic activity is larger. Futhermore, the more the 
state is involved in economic activity, e.g. through state-owned enterprises, the lesser it 
is  interested  to  control  its  own  activities  trough  competition  law  and  independent 
competition  authorities.  Hence,  the  state  may  not  be  too  concerned  about  effective 
implementation of competition law. 
Another point intensively discussed in the literature is trade liberalisation. Sometimes it 
is argued that trade liberalisation is sufficient to increase competition and a competition 
law  is  not  necessary.  This  point  potentially  dates  back  to  a  study  by  Dixit  (1984). 
However, trade liberalisation is not necessarily a substitute to competition law. In the 
literature competition law is also discussed as a complement to trade liberalisation in 
increasing efficiency, consumer welfare, growth, and development. Trade liberalisation 
promotes  these  objectives  through  reducing  government-imposed  barriers  to 
international  trade,  whereas  competition  law  addresses  anti-competitive  practices  of 
enterprises that impede access to markets or distort their efficient functioning (see e.g. 
WTO 1998, pp. 11-2). Furthermore, it is discussed that with increasing openness the 
perceived need within an economy for an effective competition law increases to protect 
domestic enterprises from global competition (Shughart et al. 1995, p. 187) or from 
potential abuses of market power by multinational enterprises and cartels (Kronthaler et 
al. 2005, pp. 19-22). 
Furthermore,  corruption  might  influence  effectiveness  of  competition  law.  First, 
countries in which corruption is high might use competition law as a remedy against 
corruption and bribes (see e.g. Kovacic 2001, pp. 296-7) and are especially concerned 
with implementation of competition law. Second, pressure groups might try to prevent 
effective enforcement of a law that could control as much as restrict their own activities 
or try to use competition law for their own interests. 
Implementation of competition law may not only be driven internally but also from 
outside  a  country.  Two  particular  points  are  the  potential  influence  of  donors  and 
regional trade agreements. 
With respect to donors it is suggested that they are interested in that countries enact and 
enforce competition law. In particular, since the 1990s various international initiatives 
in  promoting  competition  law  can  be  observed.  For  example  the  Organisation  for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began the discussion on the issue of 
competition policy with non-OECD members in 1989 (OECD 1996, p. 7). Since then 
the  issue  was  been  discussed  in  several  conferences,  including  six  ‘Global  Fora  on 
Competition’ in which many developing and transition countries took part. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is also active in promoting 
competition  law  in  developing  and  transition  countries.  Its  work  on  the  issue  of 
competition  law  dates  back  until  the  late  1970s and  up  to  now  UNCTAD  provides 
technical  assistance  for  countries  with  respect  to  competition  law  initiatives.  
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Furthermore, the World Bank as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are 
interested  in  the  issue  of  competition  law.  In  this  respect  it  is  reported  by  the 
representative of South Africa to the ‘Third Global Fora on Competition’ that “there are 
some countries whose competition laws have been introduced at the insistence of the 
IMF” (Lewis 2003, p. 2). 
The  second  relevant  external  force  is  membership  in  regional  trade  agreements.  In 
particular, regional trade agreements may be interested in whether a competition law is 
is efficiently enforced. For example, the EU pays vast attention to whether a competition 
law is efficiently enforced in new member states and provides assistance for improving 
the  enforcement  mechanisms  of  competition  law,  e.g.  through  the  European 
Competition Network (ECN). The same is valid to some extent for other regional trade 
agreements. For example: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) obliged 
member  countries  to  adopt  or  maintain  measures  against  anti-competitive  business 
actions (Nottage 2002, p. 7). The Southern Common Markets (Mercosur) have had on 
their agenda the harmonisation of competition policy since their foundation in 1991, and 
in 1996 the member countries signed a protocol which required all member states will 
have to create an effective competition regime in the near future (Tavares de Araujo Jr. 
&  Tineo  1997,  pp.  1-2).  Furthermore,  the  economies  of  the  Asia-Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation  (APEC)  started  regional  cooperation  on  competition  law  and  policy  in 
1994 (Yasuda 2003, p. 5), and competition law is also beginning to be addressed more 
extensively within the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
(Nottage 2002, p. 10). 
Last  but  not  least  it  is  likely  that  the  time  span  a  competition  law  exists  have  an 
influence on its effective enforcement. It can be assumed that efficient competition law 
enforcement  increases  over  time  (institutional  learning  curve).  In  particular,  after 
competition law enactment a competition culture has to be build up, experiences with 
the new law must be gained, competition authority staff must be qualified and hired, 
courts and judges must become familiar with competition law, etc. In this regard, an 
analysis  of  the  competition  policies  of  eighteen  transition  countries  by  Dutz  and 
Vagliasindi  (2000,  pp.  4-5)  indicates  that,  within  this  sample,  the  first  adopters  of 
competition  law,  Poland,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Romania,  and  Estonia  have  the  most 
effective competition policy. 
The discussion is not necessarily exhaustive due to the fact that there exists no model, 
which  explains  and  predicts  the  enforcement  mechanism  of  competition  law.  For 
example it can be assumed that the extent of resources, budget, staff, influence whether 
competition  law  is  effectively  enforced  or  not.  However,  relevant  data  is  barely 
available for a larger set of countries, and almost not available for longer time series. To 
our  knowledge  we  have  discussed  all  relevant  issues  that  can  be  examined  with 
available empirical data above.  
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3  Testing the relationship between macroeconomic factors 
and effective enforcement of competition law 
Data 
With regard to the analysis the main problem remains is the decision of which available 
data can appropriately measure the efficiency of competition law and can therefore be 
used as a dependent variable. 
In the literature several measures are suggested (see e.g. Nicholson 2004, p. 5). Such 
measures are for example input measures like budget, number of staff, and qualification 
of staff of the competition authority or output measures like number of investigated 
cases. However, reliable data is not really available for a larger set of countries and not 
available at all for longer time series. 4 Hence, such data is usually used in case studies 
or studies with a low number of countries included.  Another possibility is to analyse the 
laws of the different countries in terms of content and comprehensiveness. However, 
such an approach hardly indicates whether a competition law is enforced in practice. It 
rather indicates whether a country adopted a mature competition law from developed 
countries.  This  is  for  example  the  case  for  EU  application  and  member  states  or 
countries, which adopted the ‘model law on competition’ provided by UNCTAD (see 
Nicholson  2004,  pp.  12-9,  who  introduced  such  an  approach).  In  contrast  to  these 
variables a practicable approach to quantify the effectiveness of competition law for the 
study seems to be to use the World Economic Forum ‘effectiveness of antitrust policy’ 
indicator.  Although  this  indicator  has  some  disadvantages  it  also  has  some  definite 
advantages making it into a useful indicator for the study. The main disadvantage lies in 
its construction. The indicator is based on a survey of business leaders which were asked 
to rate, on a scale from 1 (lowest value) to 7 (highest value), whether antimonopoly 
policy promotes competition.5 In so far the data does not provide information about 
efficient implementation of competition law, but rather of how business leaders perceive 
competition  law.  Furthermore,  this  ranking  is,  because  the  way  it  is  generated,  a 
                                                 
4   One exception is the information on budget and staff in the handbooks of competition enforcement 
provided by the global competition review. However, these handbooks are only available since 2003. 
5   At this point it should be noted that the index calculation has changed at some points in the past. In 
1995 business leaders were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 10, and in 1996 they were asked to rate 
on a scale from 1 to 6. After 1996 business leaders were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 7. The 
question posed was in 1995 whether antitrust law prevents unfair competition or not. In 1997 the 
question was extended in so far that now it was asked whether antitrust or antimonopoly policy 
effectively promotes competition. This changed again in 2000. Since then the question is whether 
anti-monopoly policy promotes competition. In particular, both changes make it somewhat difficult 
to compare data over time. However, to include as much observations as possible in our analysis we 
only recalculated the values from 1995 and 1996 to a scale from 1 to 7. Several robustness tests, e.g. 
excluding the values of 1995 and 1996 have not substantially changed the results.  
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relatively simple rating. However, despite these deficiencies, it is probably the most 
comprehensive  indicator  available  in  terms  of  countries  included  and  time  periods 
covered.  It  is  regarded,  amongst  scientists,  as  a  useful  measure  for  cross-country 
comparison (see Nicholson 2004, pp. 4-12). Hence, despite the deficiencies mentioned 
this indicator could be regarded as useful to examine the hypotheses with respect to 
competition law implementation. 
Table 1 provides some information on the development of the ‘effectiveness of antitrust 
policy’ indicator of the World Economic Forum. It should be noted here that the number 
of  countries  included  in  the  indicator  exceeds  the  number  of  countries  with  a 
competition law. This potentially reflects that antitrust or competition policy includes 
more  measures  than  competition  law.  However,  competition  law  is  regarded  in  the 
literature as one of the most important instruments of competition policy (e.g. Evenett 
2003,  pp.  13-4),  so  that  this  indicator  might  be  a  good  proxy  for  effectiveness  of 
competition law. To include only countries that have competition law in the regression 
analysis countries are excluded which have no competition law. 
Table 1: 
The effectiveness antitrust policy indicator of the World Economic Forum 
  Effectiveness of antitrust policy* 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
No. of countries  48  49  53  53  59  59  75  80  102  104  117 
Mean  3.78  4.46  4.06  4.44  4.33  4.44  4.24  4.03  3.96  4.01  3.97 
Standard deviation  0.80  0.70  0.79  0.85  0.91  0.90  1.05  1.04  1.02  0.96  1.03 
* WEF indicator on effectiveness of antitrust policy: ranked between 1 and 7; 1 indicates that anti-monopoly policy 
in the country is lax and not effective at promoting competition, 7 indicates that it effectively promotes competition; 
values for 1995 are originally on a scale from 1 to 10 and are recalculated to a scale from 1 to 7; values for 1996 are 
originally on a scale from 1 to 6 and are recalculated to a scale from 1 to 7. 
Source: World Economic Forum (1995-2005), own calculations. 
With regard to the independent variables to examine what macroeconomic factors tell us 
about efficient enforcement of competition law we use the following data.6 
To approximate a country’s level of economic development gross domestic product per 
capita in purchasing power parity in international dollars divided by 1,000 is used. The 
size of an economy is approximated by a country’s overall ‘gross domestic product in 
current US dollars’ divided by 1,000,000,000. To proxy systemic reforms and transition, 
the overall index of economic freedom provided by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney and 
Lawson,  2005)  is  taken. This  index  includes  a variety of data to rate the degree of 
                                                 
6   Except where stated, all data are from the World Bank database ‘WDI online’.  
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economic freedom in a country. It is ranked from zero to ten, where ten is the highest 
degree  of  economic  freedom  and  zero  the  lowest.  The  index  is  available  at  5-year-
frequency, except for 2001, 2002 and 2003 for which annual data are reported. To match 
the  annual  frequency  of  the  other  macroeconomic  variables,  the  Fraser  series  are 
interpolated for the missing values, assuming linear trends. The importance of foreign 
direct investment for a country is indicated by net inflows of foreign direct investment in 
percent  of  the  gross  capital  formation  of  that  country.  As  indicator  for  the  sectoral 
structure,  particularly  reflecting  the  importance  of  the  industrial  sector  or  level  of 
industrialization, the industry share as a percentage of gross domestic product of the 
respective country is used. Government final consumption expenditure as a percentage 
of  gross  domestic  product  is  taken  to  measure  the  overall  influence  of  the  state  on 
economic activity within a country. A country’s openness to trade is approximated by 
the ratio of ‘imports of goods and services’ to gross domestic product, where imports 
include the values of all goods and other market services that the country receives from 
the rest of the world. As a measure of the existing level of corruption within a country, 
the corruption perception index (CPI) provided by Transparency International and the 
University  of  Passau  is  used  (Internet  Center  for  Corruption  Research  2006).  The 
variable provides information about the perceived degree of corruption within a country. 
The  index  is  on  a  scale  from  0  to  10,  where  0  is  the  highest  degree  of  perceived 
corruption and 10 the lowest. The influence of international agencies is approximated by 
the stock of credit per capita in current US dollars that a country received from the 
International Monetary Fund. To track the influence of regional trade agreements, the 
analysis uses dummy variables, which indicate whether a country belongs to one of the 
regional  trade  agreements  that  influence  the  enactment  of  a  competition  law.  The 
variable is binary and takes value 1 if the country is a member of the EU, NAFTA, 
APEC, Mercosur, or COMESA; otherwise it is set equal to 0. To complement this data, 
a variable is constructed which indicates for how long a competition law exists in the 
respective year. 
Method 
To  examine  empirically  which  factors  influence  effective  implementation  of 
competition  law  fixed  effects  panel  estimation  method  is  employed  (for  a  detailed 
discussion see e.g. Greene 2003 and Baltagi 2005). 7 Model specification is as follows: 
                                                 
7  Alternatively we thought of to employ a duration analysis to examine which factors slow down or 
speed up the process of effective implementation. However, with respect to data no variable exist 
which  indicate  when  a  competition  law  is  effective  enforced.  It  might  be  possible  to  assume  a 
threshold  which  indicate  effective  enforcement  on  the  basis  of  the  World  Economic  Forum 
‘effectiveness  of  antitrust  policy’  indicator.  However,  such  an  approach  cannot  be  supported  by 
reasonable assumptions which value the threshold should have. Furthermore, such an approach would 
reduce the number of observations substantially.  
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Yit = ai + xit
’ß + uit  (1) 
where Yit is the value of the effectiveness of antitrust policy indicator of the respective 
country  i  at  time  t,  ai  is  a  country  specific  fixed  parameter,  xit  is  the  vector  of 
explanatory variables, and uit is the error term.  
The use of panel data allows us to observe time series as well as the cross section of 
countries. The former informs us about changes in relationships over time, whereas the 
latter allows including several countries, so as to get more generalisable results. Panel 
analysis also allows us to control for unobserved country-specific effects. 
A standard issue in panel data econometrics is whether to treat country-specific effects 
as fixed or as random. This is particularly relevant for this estimation, because T (# of 
years) is relatively small and N (# of countries) is comparably large. Therefore, it is 
important to make the most efficient use of the data. In a case like ours which does not 
draw on a random sample from an underlying population, rather we include all countries 
that have a competition law after a certain time of point, a fixed effects model seems to 
be appropriate. Furthermore, the Hausman test suggests that xit and ai are correlated 
indicating that the random effects approach would lead to inconsistent estimators as it 
ignores this correlation. Hence, a fixed effects model is estimated. 
We  are  especially  interested  in  what  factors  influence  the  effective  application  of 
relatively new competition laws. For this reason, we start our estimation procedure by 
including all countries enacting competition law in 1990 and later. Thereafter we rerun 
the estimation procedure for all countries, which enacted competition laws after 1980 
and  1970  in order to examine whether there are substantial differences between the 
samples drawn from the different time periods. In particular, we expect that the time 
variable  becomes  more  important  with  an  increase  in  the  time  the  competition  law 
exists. The inclusion of all variables found to contribute to enactment of competition 
law produced a number of insignificant variables. As a result, we reduced the number of 
variables through stepwise regression, excluding the most insignificant variable first, to 
obtain a model only including relevant variables. 8 
The overall sample used to examine the hypotheses comprises data from 1995 to 2005 
from  71  countries,  which  enacted  competition  law  in  1990  and  later.  The  sample 
increases to a total number of countries of 78 and 84 for the estimation, where countries 
are considered that enacted competition law after 1980 and 1970 (see Annex 1). 
                                                 
8  For  all  three  estimation  models  a  F-test  of  joint  significance  for  the  excluded  variables  was 
performed. The resulting F-statistics were not significant indicating that the excluded variables are 
jointly not important  
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Discussion of empirical results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. For two reasons, countries contribute not equally 
to the estimation results. First, data availability varies from country to country. Second, 
countries  are  only  included  in  the  regression  analysis  only  after  enactment  of 
competition  law.  Hence,  an  unbalanced  panel  is  used  for  the  regression  analysis. 
Furthermore, as not for all countries of our sample data are available for all variables not 
all countries contribute to the estimation results. This might bias the results, as it can be 
assumed  that  especially for less developed countries and less democratic states data 
restrictions weigh more heavily. Although this circumstance cannot be changed, it is 
important to bear this in mind.9 Furthermore, it is important to repeat that the dependent 
variable  does  not  measure  real  effectiveness  of  competition  laws,  but  rather  the 
perceived effectiveness of competition laws in promoting competition. 
The results suggests that for all models the null hypothesis of joint insignificance, that is 
the models do not contribute to the explanation of the effectiveness of competition law, 
can  be  rejected.  Furthermore,  the  results  suggest  that  not  all  variables  which  might 
influence whether a country enacts a competition law (see Palim 1998 and Kronthaler & 
Stephan  2007)  actually  contribute  to  the  explanation  of  the  perceived  effective 
implementation of competition law. The factors contributing to whether a competition 
law  is  effectively  enforced  are  the  level  of  economic  development,  the  size  of  the 
economy, openness to trade, corruption, and the time a competition law exists.  
In particular, the empirical examination shows a significant and positive relationship 
between  the  level  of  economic  development  and  effectiveness  of  competition  law. 
Hence,  higher  developed  countries  with  a  relatively  newly  adopted  competition  law 
enforce their law more efficiently. This is although CUTS stated that in the developing 
world the need for an effective competition regime is more and more recognised (CUTS 
2003a, p. 17). The results, however, indicate that the level of economic development 
matters.  This  might  simply  reflect  that  higher  developed  countries  dispose  of  more 
resources,  professional  expertise,  a  better-developed  academic  infrastructure,  and  a 
better-developed juridical system. Furthermore, it may be the case that higher developed 
countries rely less on interventionist development strategies and have fewer problems 
with competing priorities. 
 
                                                 
9  Countries that do not contribute to the estimation results include Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Cote d’ Ivoire, Cyprus, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia,  Malta,  Moldova,  Mongolia,  Namibia,  Oman,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Serbia  and 
Montenegro, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  
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Table 2: 
Estimation results for effective enforcement of competition law 
Dependent variable: Effectiveness of competition law 
Countries enacted in 
1990 and later 
Countries enacted in 
1980 and later 
Countries enacted in 
1970 and later 
Variable 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
GDP p.c.    0.115**    0.134***    0.092**    0.117***    0.026   
GDP  - 0.001**  - 0.001**  - 0.001**  - 0.001**  - 0.001*  - 0.001* 
Economic freedom index  - 0.117    - 0.060    - 0.013   
Foreign direct investment  - 0.003    - 0.004    - 0.001   
Industry share  - 0.023    - 0.027    - 0.024   
Government consumption 
expenditure    0.002      0.010    - 0.004   
Imports of goods and services    0.011      0.012      0.016*    0.017** 
Corruption perception index    0.245***    0.208***    0.209***    0.176***    0.143**    0.137** 
International monetary fund 
credit  - 0.001    - 0.001    - 0.001   
Regional trade agreements    0.143      0.159      0.037   
Time the law exists    0.042    0.048**    0.035    0.044**    0.070***    0.086*** 
Constant    2.635**    1.593***    2.592**    1.799***    2.796**    1.900*** 
No. of countries  42  42  47  47  52  52 
No. of observations  195  195  225  225  259  259 
Rho  0.826  0.834  0.786  0.789  0.739  0.749 
F-Test  6.04***  15.58***  7.41***  18.31***  7.70***  19.88*** 
* significant at the 10%-level; ** significant at the 5%-level; *** significant at the 1%-level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
With  regard  to  the  size  of  the  economy  the  results  indicate  that  smaller  countries 
recently having enacted competition law enforce their competition law more effective 
than larger economies. At first sight, this is counterintuitive as it is often argued that 
small  countries  need  not  a  competition  law  because  import  competition  promotes 
competition  far  better  than  competition  law.  Furthermore,  it  is  often  claimed  that 
benefits from economies of scale can exceed the benefits of competition law. In fact, 
Palim (1998) and Kronthaler and Stephan (2007) suggests that larger economies have a 
higher probability that a competition law is enacted. However, smaller countries share  
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different features compared to larger countries and these might explain that competition 
law is more effective implemented once it is enacted. One possible explanation is that 
once a competition law is enacted within smaller countries it is recognized that they face 
circumstances, like higher entry barriers and higher market power by enterprises, which 
can be addressed by competition law. One other possible explanation lies in the fact 
that, in particular in the first years after adoption a lot of competition advocacy work has 
to be done to build up a competition culture and to make population and enterprises 
familiar with and aware the law. The point here is that this work might be managed 
faster and more effectively in smaller countries where less people and enterprises exists, 
so that the new law is more rapidly perceived as effective. A third explanation could be 
that in smaller economies with a lower number of firms and higher concentration levels 
compared to larger economies implementation of competition law is perceived more 
effective due to firms being more concerned with the law. The latter explanation seems 
to be less likely, as the question asked to construct the index is whether competition law 
effectively promotes competition or not, however, it cannot be completely discarded. 
The third variable having a significant positive relationship to effective competition law 
implementation, is the import variable. However, a significant relationship exists only in 
the model, which includes all countries that enacted competition law after 1970. This 
restriction indicates that countries notice the need for an effective competition law as a 
complement to increased openness and also the potential of competition law to be used 
against  abuses  of  market  power  by  multinational  enterprises  and  cartels  only  in  the 
longer-run. 
The next significant variable is the corruption index. The lower the perceived corruption 
the more effective is competition law implementation. The value of the corruption index 
decreases with increasing corruption. Interestingly Kronthaler and Stephan (2007) find 
the  opposite:  countries  with  high  corruption  have  a  higher  probability  of  enacting 
competition law. Connecting both results provides an interesting result. Whilst on the 
one  hand  enactment  of  competition  law  seems  to  be  fostered  by  interest  groups, 
enforcement seems to be hampered by interest groups. One possible explanation is that 
interest groups, politicians, and enterprises are able to capture competition law for their 
own  interests  so  that  competition  law  is  not  perceived  effective  in  promoting 
competition. Furthermore, the result indicates that countries are not able or successful to 
use  competition  law  as  a  remedy  against  corruption,  as  sometimes  suggested  in  the 
literature (see e.g. Kovacic 2001, pp. 296-7). 
The last variable found to influence effective competition law implementation is the 
time period for which a competition law has been in force. Here, a significant positive 
relationship between time and effectiveness competition law exists. This indicates that 
time matters. Interestingly, the level of economic development becomes less important 
with the inclusion of countries that have a longer experience in applying competition  
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law. This indicates that in the longer-run time and the institutional learning curve is 
more important than the level of economic development. 
All other variables are not found to contribute significantly to the perception of the 
effectiveness of competition law. However, with regard to the studies which we used as 
one  guidance  for  our  explorative  analysis  (Palim  1998  and  Kronthaler  and  Stephan 
2007),  it is worth to make a few further remarks, in particular to the findings with 
respect to economic freedom, membership in regional trade agreements, and influence 
of the IMF. 
As  already  mentioned  no  significant  relationship  between  perceived  effective 
enforcement  of  competition  law  and  economic  reforms  is  found.  Palim  (1998)  and 
Kronthaler and Stephan (2007), however, find a positive relationship between stronger 
reliance on market forces and the probability of enacting a competition law. A possible 
explanation might be that countries, which are undergoing economic reforms need a vast 
amount of resources to implement these reforms, and although they enact and might 
want to implement an effective competition law, they have not sufficient resources to 
implement competition law significant better than countries, which do not face the task 
of economic reforms. 
A further interesting result is the finding with regard to membership in regional trade 
agreements. Whilst the results in regard to enactment by Palim (1998) and Kronthaler 
and Stephan (2007) show that membership in regional trade agreements significantly 
influences the probability of enactment, no relationship is found with respect to effective 
enforcement.  This,  however,  means  that  countries,  which  belong  to a regional trade 
agreement, do not enforce their recently enacted competition law significantly better 
than countries, which do not belong to a regional trade agreement. This is astonishing, 
as for example, the EU pays great attention to whether a competition law is effectively 
enforced in its new member states and provides a lot of assistance so that competition 
law  can  be  effectively  enforced,  e.g.  through  the  European  Competition  Network 
(ECN).10 A possible explanation is that in a fixed effects model only those countries, 
which change their status from not-belonging to belonging to a regional trade agreement 
contribute to the identification of the parameter. In our sample this is the case only for 
seven  countries,  which  might  be  not  enough  to  generate  a  significant  relationship. 
However,  this  result  holds  by  using  other  estimation  techniques  such  as  pooled 
regression,  a  random  effects  model,  and  a  between  effects  model.  Hence,  it  can  be 
assumed that membership in regional trade agreements does not significantly influence 
whether a competition law is perceived to be effective or not. 
                                                 
10   The variable member includes not only the EU but also the trade agreements Mercosor, NAFTA, 
APEC and COMESA. The result, however, does not change when the models are recalculated only 
with a dummy for EU membership.  
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With regard to the influence of the IMF again no significant relationship is found with 
regard to effective enforcement, whilst the results by Kronthaler and Stephan (2007) 
indicate that countries enact competition law at the insistence of the IMF. Hence, IMF 
conditionality does contribute to whether a country enacts competition law but does not 
contribute to whether a country enforces its competition law. A possible explanation lies 
in the IMF disbursement procedure. The conditionality of IMF credit is initiated by a 
letter of intent in which the recipient countries spell out plans for reform (sometimes 
including the implementation of competition law). The first tranche is usually disbursed 
on  this  promise,  while  further  trances  are  disbursed  after  observing  progress  in  the 
fulfilment of the conditions. Competition law negotiations and implementation is a long 
lasting  process,  where  potential  enactment  of  competition  law  is  considered  as 
substantial progress. Hence, due to the length until a competition law is drafted and 
enacted  it  is  assumable  that  IMF  control  rather  enactment  than  implementation. 
However, also important in terms of effective enforcement is that it seems to be of no 
relevance  whether  competition  law  is  introduced  by  the  insistence  of  international 
organisations or donors.  
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4  Conclusion 
With  regard  to  the  question  what  macroeconomic  factors  can  tell  about  effective 
enforcement of recently enacted competition laws the study provides several interesting 
results. 
Firstly, it seems to be the case that the level of economic development is important for 
effective enforcement in the short-run, whilst in the longer-run the time a competition 
law  exists  seems  to  be  more  relevant  to  explain  effective  competition  law 
implementation.  This  indicates  that  even  less-developed  countries  have  a  chance  to 
implement  an  efficient  competition  law.  Secondly,  perceived  effectiveness  of 
competition  law  decreases  with  the  size  of  an  economy.  This  indicates  that  larger 
countries  should  be  rather  more  concerned  about  competition  advocacy  activities  to 
build up a competition culture than smaller countries. Thirdly, at least in the longer-run 
increasing  openness  to  trade  seems  to  increase  the  need  to  implement  an  effective 
competition  law,  maybe  to  address  anticompetitive  behaviour  by  foreign  firms  or 
multinational  enterprises  or  cartels.  Fourthly,  with  regard  to  corruption,  the  results 
indicate that countries with high corruption should be concerned about the fact that 
interest groups can hamper effective implementation of competition law or, even worse, 
can capture competition law for their own purposes. Hence, in particular in countries in 
which corruption is high serious efforts have to be taken that a competition law really 
fulfilled  its  objective,  to protect  competition  not competitors  and  interest  groups.  A 
further interesting result is that countries that might introduce competition law at the 
insistence  of  IMF  do  not  perform  worse  or  better  in  effective  competition  law 
implementation than countries that enacted competition law for other reasons. At last, 
the empirical result that membership in regional trade agreements does not contribute to 
perceived effective enforcement is rather astonishing and cannot be explained by this 
study.  
In general, macroeconomic factors cannot tell the whole story of what contributes to 
whether countries effectively implement competition law or not. For further insights it is 
hence important to go more into detail with help of case studies not at least to explain 
the presented results in greater detail.  
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Annex 1: 
Countries with a competition law 
Country








status in 2005  World region
e 
Canada  1889  H  H  North and Central America 
United States  1890  H  H  North and Central America 
United Kingdom  1948  H  H  Europe 
Austria  1951  H  H  Europe 
France  1953  H  H  Europe 
Japan  1953  H  H  Middle East and Asia 
Norway  1953  H  H  Europe 
Sweden  1953  H  H  Europe 
Denmark  1955  H  H  Europe 
Finland  1958  H  H  Europe 
Germany  1958  H  H  Europe 
Netherlands  1958  H  H  Europe 
New Zealand  1958  H  H  Oceania 
Israel  1959  H  H  Middle East and Asia 
Belgium  1960  H  H  Europe 
Switzerland  1964  H  H  Europe 
Australia  1965  H  H  Oceania 
India  1969  L  L  Middle East and India 
Luxembourg  1970  H  H  Europe 
Pakistan  1970  L  L  Middle East and Asia 
Chile  1973  LM  UM  South America 
Greece  1977  UM  H  Europe 
Ireland  1978  H  H  Europe 
South Africa  1979  LM  UM  Africa 
Argentina  1980  UM  UM  South America 
Korea, Rep.  1980  UM  H  Middle East and Asia 
Sri Lanka  1987  L  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Kenya  1988  L  L  Africa 
Cyprus  1989  H  H  Europe 
Gabon  1989  UM  UM  Africa 
Spain  1989  H  H  Europe 
Benin  1990  L  L  Africa 
Hungary  1990  UM  UM  Europe 
Italy  1990  H  H  Europe 
Poland  1990  LM  UM  Europe 
Bulgaria  1991  LM  LM  Europe 
Cote d’Ivoire  1991  LM  L  Africa 
Czech Republic  1991  LM  UM  Europe 
Kazakhstan  1991  LM  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Latvia  1991  UM  UM  Europe 
Peru  1991  LM  LM  South America 
Russian Federation  1991  UM  UM  Europe 
Taiwan Province of China  1991  H  H  Middle East and Asia 
Tunisia  1991  LM  LM  Africa 
Belarus  1992  UM  LM  Europe 
Colombia  1992  LM  LM  South America 
Fiji  1992  LM  LM  Oceania 
Liechtenstein  1992  H  H  Europe 
Lithuania  1992  LM  UM  Europe 
Mali  1992  L  L  Africa 
Mexico  1992  UM  UM  North and Central America 
Moldova  1992  LM  L  Europe 
Tajikistan  1992  L  L  Middle East and Asia 
Ukraine  1992  LM  LM  Europe  
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e 
Uzbekistan  1992  LM  L  Middle East and Asia 
Venezuela  1992  UM  UM  South America 
Azerbaijan  1993  LM  LM  Middle East and Asia 
China  1993  L  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Estonia  1993  UM  UM  Europe 
Iceland  1993  H  H  Europe 
Jamaica  1993  LM  LM  North and Central America 
Portugal  1993  UM  H  Europe 
Slovenia  1993  UM  H  Europe 
Brazil  1994  UM  LM  South America 
Burkina Faso  1994  L  L  Africa 
Costa Rica  1994  LM  UM  North and Central America 
Kyrgyzstan  1994  L  L  Middle East and Asia 
Malta  1994  UM  H  Europe 
Mongolia  1994  L  L  Middle East and Asia 
Senegal  1994  L  L  Africa 
Slovakia  1994  LM  UM  Europe 
Tanzania  1994  L  L  Africa 
Turkey  1994  LM  UM  Europe 
Zambia  1994  L  L  Africa 
Albania  1995  L  LM  Europe 
Algeria  1995  LM  LM  Africa 
Croatia  1995  UM  UM  Europe 
Georgia  1996  LM  LM  Europe 
Panama  1996  LM  UM  North and Central America 
Romania  1996  LM  LM  Europe 
Serbia and Montenegro  1996  LM  LM  Europe 
Trinidad and Tobago  1996  UM  UM  North and Central America 
Zimbabwe  1996  L  L  Africa 
Faeroe Islands  1997  H  H  Europe 
Cameroon  1998  L  L  Africa 
Malawi  1998  L  L  Africa 
Indonesia  1999  L  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Macedonia, FYR  1999  LM  LM  Europe 
Thailand  1999  LM  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Armenia  2000  L  LM  Europe 
Jordan  2000  LM  LM  Middle East and Asia 
Morocco  2000  LM  LM  Africa 
Oman  2000  UM  UM  Middle East and Asia 
Uruguay  2000  UM  UM  South America 
Antigua and Barbuda  2001  UM  UM  North and Central America 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2001  LM  LM  Europe 
Cambodia  2002  L  L  Middle East and Asia 
Papua New Guinea  2002  L  L  Oceania 
Barbados  2003  UM  UM  North and Central America 
Mauritius  2003  UM  UM  Africa 
Namibia  2003  LM  LM  Africa 
Singapore  2005  H  H  Middle East and Asia 
a A country is taken to have a competition law if a law exists that addresses one or all kinds of anti-competitive behaviour 
which is normally part of a competition law, such as monopolies, cartels, horizontal and vertical cooperation, mergers, and 
predatory pricing. – 
b The year indicates when a country enacted its first competition law. – 
c Development status classify-
cation: H stands for high income countries, UM for upper middle income countries, LM for lower middle income countries, 
L for low income countries. – 
d The World Bank analytical classification dates back until 1987. Countries that have enacted 
before 1987 are denoted with the development status by 1987. – 
e Regional classification is that of the International Bar 
Association. 
Source: Internet and literature search; World Bank income classification.  
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Annex 2: 
Competition policy enforcement in transition countries 
Competition policy implementation 
b 
Country  Competition law 
a 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Hungary  1990  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Poland  1990  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Bulgaria  1991  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+  3- 
Czech Republic  1991  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Kazakhstan  1991  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Latvia  1991  2+  2+  2+  3-  3-  3- 
Russia  1991  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+ 
Belarus  1992  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Lithuania  1992  3-  3  3  3  3  3 
Moldova  1992  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Slovenia  1992  3-  3-  3-  3-  3-  3- 
Tajikistan  1992  2-  2-  2-  2-  2-  2- 
Ukraine  1992  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+ 
Uzbekistan  1992  2  2  2  2-  2-  2- 
Azerbaijan  1993  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Estonia  1993  3-  3-  3-  3-  3-  3- 
Kyrgyz Republic  1994  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Slovak Republic  1994  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Albania  1995  2-  2-  2-  2-  2  2 
Croatia  1995  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+ 
Georgia  1996  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Romania  1996  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+  2+ 
Serbia and Mont.  1996  -  1  1  1  1  1 
FYR Macedonia  1999  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Armenia  2000  1  2  2  2  2  2+ 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2001  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Turkmenistan  -  1  1  1  1  1  1 
a The year indicates when a country enacted its first competition law. – 
b EBRD competition policy indicator: ranked 
between 1 and 4+, whereas 1 indicates that in the specific country exists no competition legislation and institution; 
4+ indicates that the standards are equal to those of typical advanced economies. 
Source: Internet and literature search; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2000-2005).  
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Annex 3: 
Effectiveness of antitrust policy* 
* WEF indicator on effectiveness of antitrust policy: ranked between 1 and 7; 1 indicates that anti-monopoly policy 
in the country is lax and not effective at promoting competition, 7 indicates that it effectively promotes competition. 
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